noun

definition

Physical frame.

definition

Main section.

definition

Coherent group.

definition

Material entity.

definition

The shank of a type, or the depth of the shank (by which the size is indicated).

example

a nonpareil face on an agate body

definition

A three-dimensional object, such as a cube or cone.

verb

definition

To give body or shape to something.

definition

To construct the bodywork of a car.

definition

To embody.

definition

To murder someone.

definition

(by extension) To utterly defeat someone.

definition

To hard counter a particular character build or play style. Frequently used in the passive voice form, get bodied by.

Examples of bodies in a Sentence

Some people's bodies break in ways that we don't understand.

Their bodies were slick with sweat, and she lingered in the afterglow, lost in the heat and silk of his skin.

According to this alternative, these organic bodies are compound or corporeal substances, between monads and phenomena; and Leibnitz is a metaphysical realist.

The tattooing of their bodies is less artistic than that of the New Zealanders, and much more limited than among some of the other islanders.

Its strength is shown in England in the growing readiness of the different religious bodies to co-operate in movements for the purifying of public morality and for the better observance - of Sunday.

The origins of the veneration of relics lie in the anxiety for the preservation of the bodies of the martyrs.

Nothing is more natural than that the pious solicitude felt by all men for the bodies of their loved ones should in the primitive Christian Churches have been turned most strongly towards the bodies of those who had met with death in confessing their faith.

About the end of the 3rd and the beginning of the 4th century it became customary for the bodies of the martyrs not to be buried, but preserved for the purpose of veneration.

Already individual Christians began to possess themselves of portions of the bodies of martyrs, and to carry them about with them.

Nobody hesitated to divide up the bodies of the saints in order to afford as many portions of them as possible.

The only doubt which was felt was as to whether the bodies of the saints should be divided, and removed from their original resting-place.

Rome, it is true, possessed in the bodies of Peter and Paul a treasure the virtue of which outshone all the sacred treasures of the East.

But in the long run these substitutes for relics did not satisfy the Christians of the West, and, following the example of the Eastern Church, they took to dividing the bodies of the saints.

Medieval relics in the West also were mostly portions of the bodies of saints or of things which they had used during their lives.

The most famous relics discovered during the middle ages, were those of the apostle James at St Jago de Compostella in Spain (see Pilgrimage), the bodies of the three kings, which were brought from Milan to Cologne in 1164 by the emperor Frederick I.

There are in reality two species of substances, or entirely distinct things, those which are impenetrably resisting, and those which are conscious substances; and it is impossible to reduce bodies and souls to one another, because resistance is incompatible with the attributes of spirit, and consciousness inexplicable by the attributes of body.

Hence, when he returns to organisms, it does not surprise us that he assigns to ova and spermatozoa cell-souls, to the impregnated ovum germ-soul, to plants tissue-souls, to animals nerve-souls; or that he regards man's body and soul as born together in the impregnated ovum, and gradually evolved from the bodies and souls of lower animals.

He believes that mind and soul are inherent attributes of all bodies.

In order to exert force, or at all events that force of reciprocal pressure which we best understand, and on which, in impact, the third law of motion was founded, there are always at least two bodies, enduring, triply extended, mobile, each inert, mutually impenetrable or resistent, different yet similar; and in order to have produced any effect but equilibrium, some bodies must at some time have differed either in mass or in velocity, otherwise forces would only have neutralized one another.

Why do bodies exist, with all these conditions, so similar yet different - that is, in so harmonious an order?

Thereupon Spinoza advanced a pantheism which supposed that bodies and souls are not, as Descartes thought, different substances, but merely attributes - the one the extension and the other the thought of one substance, Nature or God.

Leibnitz, again, having become equally dissatisfied with Cartesianism, Spinozism and the Epicurean realism of Gassendi, in the latter part of his life came still nearer than Spinoza to metaphysical idealism in his monadology, or half-Pythagorean,half-Brunistic analysis of bodies into monads, or units, or simple substances, indivisible and unextended, but endowed with perception and appetite.

On the other hand, under the influence of the mechanics of his day, which had hardly distinguished between inertia, or the inability of a body to change itself, and resistance or the ability of bodies to oppose one another, he concluded that, as inertia is passive, so is resistance, and refused to recognize that in collision the mutual resistance of moving bodies is a force, or active power, of changing their movements in opposite directions.

From these two arbitrary hypotheses about corporeal motion, that it requires indivisibly simple elements, and that it offers only passive resistance, he concluded that behind bodies there must be units, or monads, which would be at once substantial, simple, indivisible and active.

He further supposed that the monads are " incorporeal automata," not interacting like bodies, but each perceiving what was passing in the other, and acting in consequence by appetite, or self-acting.

Such mentally endowed substances might be called souls; but, as he distinguished between perception and apperception or consciousness, and considered that perceptions are often unconscious, he preferred to divide monads into unconscious entelechies of inorganic bodies, sentient souls of animals, and rational souls, or spirits, of men; while he further concluded that all these are derivative monads created by God, the monad of monads.

All derivative monads, he allowed, are accompanied by bodies, which, however, are composed of other monads dominated by a central monad.

Further, he explained the old Cartesian difficulty of the relation of body and mind by transforming the Spinozistic parallelism of extension and thought into a parallelism between the motions of bodies and the perceptions of their monads; motions always proceeding from motions, and perceptions from perceptions; bodies acting according to efficient causes, and souls according to final causes by appetition, and as if one influenced the other without actually doing so.

Up to this point, then, Leibnitz opened one of the chief avenues to metaphysical idealism, the resolution of the material into the immaterial, the analysis of bodies into mental elements.

His theory of bodies involved an idealistic analysis neither into bodily atoms nor into mathematical units, but into mentally endowed simple substances.

There remained, however, his theory of the nature of bodies; and here he hesitated between two alternatives.

According to one alternative, which consistently flowed from the psychological idealism of Descartes, as well as from his own monadism, he suggested that bodies are real phenomena; phenomena, because they are aggregates of monads, which derive their unity only from appearing together to our perceptions; real phenomena well founded, because they result from real monads.

In support of this view, he said that bodies are not substances, though substantiata; that their apparent motion and resistance are results of the passions of their monads; that their primary matter is nothing but passive power of their monads; that the series of efficient causes between them is merely phenomenal.

According to the other alternative, however, he suggested that at least organic bodies are compound or corporeal substances, which are not phenomena; but something realizing or rather substantializing phenomena, and not mere aggregates of monads, but something substantial beyond their monads, because an organic body, though composed of monads, has a real unity (unio realis).

He was held to this belief in the substantiality of bodies by his Christianity, by the influence of Aristotle, of scholasticism and of Cartesianism, as well as by his own mechanics.

Hume saw that in making all the objects of perception ideas Berkeley had given as little reason for inferring substantial souls as substantial bodies.

This third position isarelic of ancient metaphysical realism; although it must be remembered that Kant does not go to the length of Descartes and Locke, who supposed that from mere ideas we could know bodies and souls, but suggests that beneath the phenomena of outer and inner sense the thing in itself may not be heterogeneous (ungleichartig).

The analysis of bodies into immaterial elements by Leibnitz incited Lotze.

In a way they returned to the wider opinions of Aristotle, which had come down to Descartes and Locke, that reason in going beyond sense knows more things than phenomena; yet they would not hear of external bodies, or of bodies at all.

Agreeing, then, with Kant that primary qualities are as mental as secondary, he agreed also with Kant that all the Nature we know as a system of bodies moving in time and space is sensible phenomena.

He accepted the Leibnitzian fallacy that unity is indivisibility, which led to the Leibnitzian analysis of material bodies into immaterial monads, indivisible and therefore unextended, and to the theory of monadic souls and entelechies.

In the first place, he resolved the doubt of Leibnitz about bodies by deciding entirely against his realistic alternative that an organic body is a substantia realizans phaenomena, and for his idealistic alternative that every body is a phenomenon and not a substance at all.

He believed in reciprocal action; and the very essence of his metaphysics consists in sublimating the interaction of bodies into the interaction of immaterial elements, which produce effects on one another and on the soul as one of them.

But instead of returning to the concrete fact of the equivalence of momentum, by which each body moving makes the other move oppositely, he denied that bodies do reciprocally act on one another, and even that bodies as mutually resisting substances press one another apart in collision.

Our bodies were reduced by Lotze to the general ruck of phenomenal appearances.

But in a philosophy which reduces everything to phenomenal appearance except the self-interacting substance of God, there is no room for either the bodies or the souls of finite substances or human persons.

Combining with this the central dogma of Fechner that spirit extends throughout the world of bodily appearance, he concludes that the realities of the world are " wills," that bodies are mere appearances of " wills," and that there is one universal and all-embracing spirit which is " will."

He holds, like Hume, that nothing is real except our sensations and complexes of sensory elements; that the ego is not a definite, unalterable, sharply bounded unity, but its continuity alone is important; and that we know no real causes at all, much less real causes of our sensations; or, as he expresses it, bodies do not produce sensations, but complexes of sensations form bodies.

In short, sensations are elements and bodies complexes of these elements.

According to him, whatever inferences we make, certain or uncertain, are mere economies of thought, adapting ideas to sensations, and filling out the gaps of experience by ideas; whatever we infer, whether bodies, or molecules, or atoms, or space of more than three dimensions, are all without distinction equally provisional conceptions, things of thought; and " bodies or things are compendious mental symbols for groups of sensations - symbols which do not exist outside thought."

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